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OWNERSHIP VERSUS ENVIRONMENT: DISENTANGLING THE SOURCES
OF PUBLIC-SECTOR INEFFICIENCY
Ann P. Bartel and Ann E. Harrison*
Abstract—An unanswered question in the debate on public-sector inefficiency is whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively substitute for privatization. Using a 1981–1995 panel data set of all
public and private manufacturing establishments in Indonesia, we analyze
whether public-sector inefficiency is primarily due to agency-type problems or to the environment in which public-sector enterprises (PSEs)
operate, as measured by the soft budget constraint and the degree of
internal and external competition. The results, obtained from fixed-effects
specifications, provide support for both models. Ownership matters because, for a given level of government financing or competition, PSEs
perform worse than their private-sector counterparts. The environment
matters because only PSEs which received government financing or those
shielded from import competition or foreign ownership performed worse
than private enterprises. The results suggest that the efficiency of PSEs can
be increased through privatization, through manipulation of the environment, or through a combination of both approaches.

While much has indeed been learned about the effectiveness
of privatization as a political and economic policy, there are
several important areas that need further research. . . . Researchers need to . . . conclusively document whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively
serve as a substitute (or precursor) for privatization.
Megginson and Netter (2001)

I.

Introduction

W

hy privatize? One primary objective of privatization is
to enhance the efficiency of public enterprises. Although most studies find that public-sector plants perform
poorly relative to their private-sector counterparts, other studies get mixed or ambiguous results.1 One explanation for the
conflicting evidence is that efficiency gains from privatization
depend on a variety of factors, including the degree of competition, the regulatory environment, the magnitude of market
failure, and the administrative capabilities of the government.
Peltzman (1971) questions whether changing ownership alone
can affect firm behavior. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) present a
formal argument for this view; in their model, privatization
enhances
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1 Studies that find that public-sector enterprises perform poorly include
Boardman and Vining (1989), Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1994), La Porta
and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), and Boubakri and Cosset (1998). Studies
that get mixed or ambiguous results include Funkhouser and MacAvoy
(1979), Groves et al. (1994), Kole and Mulherin (1997), and Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001).

efficiency only if “control rights” over employment decisions
are shifted to the plant manager. In their review of the arguments for and against privatization, Vickers and Yarrow (1991)
conclude that the attributes of the environment influence the
efficiency gains from privatization.
Others, however, argue that public-sector ownership is always inferior to private sector ownership. These types of
arguments, as illustrated by Ehrlich et al. (1994) and Karpoff
(2001), are often based on some variant of a principal-agent
problem: the principal (the government) either cannot or does
not choose to monitor the managers properly. This approach
focuses on ownership as the explanation for poor public-sector
performance.
The empirical studies on privatization have typically focused on identifying the magnitude of the gains, rather than
attempting to identify their sources or to control for the conditions under which privatization occurred. From a policy
perspective, however, it is critical to be able to identify the
determinants of improved performance that results from privatization. For example, if public-sector enterprises (PSEs)
perform poorly because they are located in sectors with very
little internal or external competition, or because of access to
soft loans, then public-sector plants could be induced to behave
like the private sector in a competitive, subsidy-free environment. These considerations become critical if privatization has
been delayed or is not politically feasible in the short run. In
this paper, we focus on the role of ownership versus the
environment as alternative explanations for poor public-sector
behavior.2 To date, no paper has been able to fully address this
issue.3
In their review of the state of the literature, Megginson and
Netter (2001) conclude that more research is needed to
“. . . conclusively document whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively serve as a substitute (or
precursor) for privatization.” This is precisely our goal. We use
a 1981–1995 panel of all public and private manufacturing
establishments in Indonesia and measure two important environmental factors: (1) soft budget constraints4 and (2) the
degree of internal and external competition. Our measures of
2 In contrasting the roles of ownership and environment, we do not distinguish between different types of owners after privatization, that is, our focus
is on private versus public owners. Barberis et al. (1996) study the restructuring that occurred in privatized Russian shops when there were new owners
and new managers, compared to giving equity to the old managers.
3 Pinto and Van Wijnbergen (1995), Claessens and Djankov (1997), and
Bertero and Rondi (2000) study the effect of soft loans on performance
but, due to data limitations, do not fully address the issue of ownership
versus environment.
4 Research on the effects of the soft budget constraint goes back to Kornai
(1979), who first postulated that the possibility of bailouts for public-sector
enterprises could be used to explain their poor performance. See Kornai
(1998) for a more recent discussion of the soft budget constraint.
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competition include import competition, domestic competition,
and foreign investment. In Indonesia during 1981–1995, many
manufacturing enterprises were privatized, tariff and nontariff
barriers were reduced, the financial sector was opened up to
private banks, state banks began to be phased out, and controls
on foreign owners were relaxed. These large, exogenous
changes in ownership and the policy environment provide an
ideal setting for this paper.
Our empirical results, which are obtained from fixed-effects
specifications, suggest that reforming the environment and
privatizing public enterprises are substitute policies. Privatization improves performance, because for a given level of government financing and internal and external competition, PSEs
perform worse than their private-sector counterparts. We calculate that if a public firm is fully privatized, its productivity
will rise by 1.6 percentage points. The same result, however,
could be achieved by manipulating the environment. Specifically, our results show that if the role of state development
banks in financing public-sector investment is reduced, publicsector performance improves. In particular, if state financing of
new investment by public enterprises falls from 100% to 70%,
import penetration rises by 3 percentage points, or foreign
ownership in the enterprises increases by three-quarters of a
percentage point, then these changes will each produce the
same gain in productivity as a full privatization. Reforming the
environment is likely to be much less painful politically and
represents much more incremental change than a full privatization.
Section II reviews the ownership and environment hypotheses and derives the estimating equation. In section III
the Indonesian data are described, and in section IV results
are presented. Section V discusses a number of extensions
to the basic empirical model. In particular, we consider the
possibility of endogeneity bias and use a number of techniques to control for this. We find that taking endogeneity
into account does not affect the results. Finally, we show
that our findings are robust to a variety of specification
checks. Section VI concludes and discusses the implications
for government policy.
II.

Empirical Framework

A. The Ownership-versus-Environment Debate

In the literature on privatization, two primary explanations
have been offered for the poor performance of public-sector
firms. The first explanation is that PSEs are more inefficient
because of principal-agent problems. Ehrlich et al. (1994) is a
good illustration of this branch of the literature. In that model,
the level of total factor productivity (TFP) is a function of
managerial time allocated to current production, and the rate of
TFP growth (TFPG) is positively related to the manager’s
commitment to investments in plant-specific capital. Publicsector managers, according to their model, spend too much
time pursuing independent private objectives. This has two

effects: it reduces the time spent building plant-specific capital
(which raises TFPG in the long run), and it has an ambiguous
effect on the time spent monitoring current production, which
affects the current level of TFP. This framework implies that
levels of productivity in public-sector plants need not be lower
than in the private-sector in the short run, but that productivity
growth will be lower for PSEs. In the longer term, of course,
lower public-sector productivity growth should eventually lead
to lower productivity levels than in the private sector. One
insight provided by this model is that it can explain why PSEs
could survive in the medium term even in a competitive
environment. If the most efficient enterprises were taken over
by the government initially—as appears to have been the case
in Indonesia—then the myopia of these managers does not
immediately translate into lower efficiency levels.
Ehrlich et al. (1994) illustrates a wider literature which
argues that PSEs are more inefficient primarily due to
principal-agent problems. One implication of this literature
is that there should be a consistent negative coefficient on
public ownership in any comparisons of productivity
growth among public and private enterprises. But others
have presented evidence which disputes this view. For
example, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) show that in Britain,
Chile, and Poland during the 1980s ownership changes by
themselves are generally not associated with changes in
performance. Kole and Mulherin (1997) use data on U.S.
government acquisitions of several foreign firms operating
in the United States during World War II to show that in a
competitive environment, ownership per se does not determine firm performance. Other evidence reported in the
popular press also supports the claim that the effects of
privatization in any particular context will be highly dependent upon the environment in which it is implemented.5
The debate about the relevance of the ownership and
environment hypotheses can only be resolved through empirical analysis. To date, however, no one has conducted a
thorough empirical investigation that simultaneously allows
for the role of ownership and environment effects. For
example, Ehrlich et al. (1994) do not test whether poor
public-sector performance is attributable purely to ownership or to the fact that private and public enterprises may
operate in different environments. Others who have focused
on the attributes of the environment—such as Pinto and Van
Winjbergen (1995) and Bertero and Rondi (2000), who
study the effects of soft loans—focus only on PSEs and are
therefore unable to identify an ownership effect. In the next
5 For example, see the November 3, 1998 issue of The Financial Times,
which reports that the Jamaican government retook control of the largest
three sugar mills, which had been privatized four years earlier. The
government claimed that the mills had “not met productivity and production targets and have depended too heavily on state support.” The March
11, 1998 issue of The New York Times reports that the Argentinian
government has eliminated the duopoly maintained by its two telephone
companies, pointing out that since the “1990 privatization, the two
companies have increased the number of lines in the country from three
million to seven million, but their monopolies have kept Argentine
telephone rates high by international standards.”
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section, we describe the equation we use to simultaneously
test the ownership and environment hypotheses.
B. Measuring Total Factor Productivity

As our yardstick of relative performance, we focus exclusively on TFP, at least in part because prior research (La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) has shown that a very
large part of the gains from privatization is due to productivity growth.
A general production function for plant i in sector j at
time t is given by
Y ijt ⫽ A ijt F共Z ijt 兲.

(1)

Here Y ijt is a real measure of plant-level output, and Z is a
vector of M inputs. In our estimation, we include as inputs
both skilled and unskilled labor, capital inputs, and materials. A ijt is a plant-specific index of Hicks-neutral technical
progress which will depend on a number of factors, including ownership. In the Appendix, we show that equation (1)
can be rewritten in the following log-difference form:

冘 B d ln Z
M

d ln Yijt ⫽ d ln Aijt ⫹ 

m

mijt

.

(2)

m⫽1

All variables have been rewritten as the first difference of
their logs. Output growth can be decomposed into two
sources: growth in productivity and growth in input use. In
a regression framework, the coefficients on the M inputs
include two components: the markup parameter , and the
factor share B m . By not constraining the coefficients, we
allow both factor shares and markups to vary.
C. Ownership Effects

We denote public ownership as PUB and allow A to have
the following components:
A it ⫽ exp共1 PUBit ⫹ 2 PUBit ⫻ time ⫹ ␥Xit
⫹ fi ⫹ dt ⫹ eit 兲.

(3)

The degree of public ownership, PUB, affects both the
level and the growth rate of productivity. The coefficient on
PUB measures the relationship between ownership and the
level of A; the coefficient on PUB ⫻ time measures the
relationship between ownership and the change in A. The
framework due to Ehrlich et al. (1994) implies that the
coefficient on PUB is ambiguous, whereas the coefficient
on PUB ⫻ time should be negative. We also include a
vector X of other factors which could also affect productivity; it is discussed in more detail below. The framework in
equation (3) allows for a plant-specific fixed effect f i , which
reflects fixed differences across plants which are persistent
but unobserved over time; time effects d t , which are com-
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mon to plants but which vary over time; and a random
unobserved component e it .
In order to take into account the plant-specific effect, we
log-linearize equation (3) and transform it into first differences and then combine it with equation (2), which yields
the following specification:
d ln Yit ⫽ 1 dPUBit ⫹ 2 d共PUBit ⫻ time兲 ⫹ ␥dXit

冘 B d ln Z

(4)

M

⫹

m

mit

.

m⫽1

In this specification, ownership enters because it can affect
Hicks-neutral productivity growth by directly affecting
managerial incentives.
A number of previous studies, especially the early studies, simply compare efficiency use, across public and private plants, of one factor, such as capital or labor. This is
equivalent to estimating equation (4) in levels with M ⫽ 1,
ignoring the fixed effect, and setting all the ␥’s and ’s as
well as B 2 through B M equal to 0. Some examples of these
studies are Boardman and Vining (1989), Funkhouser and
MacAvoy (1979), and Groves et al. (1994).6
Ehrlich et al. (1994) test for the effect of ownership by
estimating a levels equation with plant fixed effects which
includes ownership and the interaction of ownership with time.
Consistent with the predictions of their model, they find a
negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between
ownership and time, suggesting that TFPG is slower for public
enterprises. But the coefficient on ownership alone is not
robust, suggesting no clear relationship between TFP levels
and public ownership. Furthermore, they do not test whether
lower TFPG in the public-sector is attributable purely to
ownership or to the fact that private and public enterprises may
operate in different environments.
D. Environment Effects

In order to measure the effect of the environment on
TFPG (d ln A), we expand equation (4) by including the
attributes of the environment in the vector X and also allow
PUB’s effect on d ln A to be a function of these attributes.
We consider the roles of two main attributes of the environment: (1) the soft budget constraint and (2) the degree of
internal and external competition.
6 Boardman and Vining (1989) use sales per employee and sales per
asset as measures of efficiency and find that private enterprises are more
efficient, controlling for assets, number of employees, market share,
concentration, country, and industry. Funkhouser and MacAvoy (1979)
analyze labor productivity and do not control for any other factors. They
find that physical output per employee is higher in private plants, but sales
or value-added per employee is lower. Groves et al. (1994) find that giving
Chinese enterprises greater autonomy (either in selling output outside state
quotas or in retaining a larger share of profits) does not lead to an increase
in productivity, but increasing the use of bonuses as a fraction of the wage
bill and increasing the use of contract workers does.
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Compared to private-sector firms, public-sector firms are
more likely to operate in a soft budget constraint regime
where the government provides additional resources or
otherwise bails them out.7 Hence, the pure effect of ownership can only be measured by controlling for the soft budget
constraint. In addition, there is evidence that the softness of
the constraint can vary across PSEs at a point in time, and
can also change over time (Kornai, 1990). This implies that
the effect of ownership will depend on the degree of
softness of the budget constraint.
Second, compared to private-sector enterprises, PSEs
may face different degrees of internal and external competition. For example, PSEs are often established in sectors
where the government seeks to regulate what would have
been a natural monopoly. A different competitive environment is likely to directly affect the efficiency parameter, A
(see Nickell, 1996). To the extent that PSEs operate in
industries with large entry barriers, there is an omitted
variable, which could bias our results. The direction of the
bias will depend on whether greater internal competition is
likely to lead to higher or lower productivity. We also
include an interaction term between ownership and internal
competition to determine if privatization’s success depends
on the degree of internal competition.
Third, PSEs are typically located in sectors which receive
special protection from import competition. Protection from
imports could have a direct effect on the Hicks-neutral term
d ln A, if plants subjected to import competition are more
likely to innovate, use better quality inputs, or learn about
better production techniques. Consequently, failing to control for differences in protection from imports could lead to
the incorrect conclusion that PSEs are more inefficient, if
lack of international competition is correlated with poor
performance. An interaction term between ownership and
the degree of international competition tests if privatization’s success depends on the degree of competition from
imports.
Finally, there is evidence that foreign-owned firms in
developing countries exhibit higher levels of productivity or
higher productivity growth either because of intangible
assets that cannot be exploited through arm’s-length agreements, or because of better knowledge about foreign technology developments or better access to credit.8 Because
many privatizations have involved the transfer of assets
from public to foreign owners, including an interaction term
will allow us to test whether these kinds of public-private
ventures are likely to be more successful than privatizations
to domestic private owners.
In the next section of the paper we describe the data we
use to implement equation (4) empirically.
7 Sometimes, private firms receive subsidies from the government. Lizal
and Svejnar (2002) found that, in the 1990s, large private firms in the
Czech Republic were operating under a soft budget constraint.
8 See Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), and
Harrison and McMillan (2003).

III.

Data

We apply our framework to the manufacturing sector in
Indonesia for the period 1981–1995. Indonesia has a number of features which make it an ideal setting for studying
the effects of ownership and environment. Over this period
the Indonesian government privatized many enterprises,
which allows us to examine the impact of changes in
ownership on enterprise performance. When Indonesia became independent in 1945, its constitution provided for
government ownership of mineral resources and other “important” sectors of the economy. State enterprises were
operated by indigenous Indonesians, and the government’s
infusion of capital into these enterprises was viewed as a
way of providing a counterweight to the Chinese firms that
tended to dominate the private-sector.9 During the early
1980s, the government infused much capital into the state
enterprise sector, facilitating its growth. But, beginning in
the late 1980s and continuing into the early 1990s, a wave
of privatizations occurred,10 so that by 1992, the privatesector in Indonesia became, for the first time, the driving
force behind economic growth.11
During 1981–1995 there were also important changes in
the environment. A significant liberalization of trade occurred in the late 1980s, which provides variation in the
variable we use to measure external competition. Average
tariffs fell from 26% in 1989 to 18% in 1995, and the
maximum tariff was cut in half. There were also important
changes in foreign investment legislation. In 1974, in response to riots against Japanese foreign investors, a presidential decree had placed significant limits on the extent of
foreign equity participation. New investment by foreign
companies could only be conducted through joint ventures;
all new ventures required at least a 20% equity stake by
Indonesian companies; after 10 years Indonesian equity
ownership was supposed to equal 51%. However, from
1986 through 1994, in large measure due to the need for
inflows of foreign investment, the government passed a
series of exemptions to the 1974 law. Finally, in 1994, the
Indonesian government eliminated virtually all restrictions
on foreign equity investments.
The banking environment also changed dramatically. In
1983, Indonesia relaxed the credit ceilings of individual
banks and also relaxed interest-rate controls. This led to a
fall in the share of state banks, which had previously
dominated the banking sector. The share of credit provided
by state banks fell from 87% in 1981 to 72% in 1988
(Goeltom, 1995, p. 8). Nevertheless, these banks continued
to dominate the banking sector, and the interest-rate spread
between private and public banks remained a very large 500
to 800 basis points. A series of additional reforms between
1988 and 1990 reduced barriers to entry into the banking
9

See Bresnan (1993, p. 253).
The Fourth Five-Year Plan, announced in early 1984, called for an
increased role for the private-sector (Bresnan, 1993, p. 254).
11 Bresnan (1993, p. 264).
10
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TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
A. Public-Sector Enterprises
Ratio of Public to Private

Year

% of Total Output Accounted for
by Public-Sector Enterprises

Age

Size

Skilled/Unskilled

1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1993
1995

14.4
17.3
17.3
17.8
18.2
13.7
13.3

2.1
2.1
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.0
1.8

4.0
5.3
6.0
6.3
7.0
5.8
5.4

3.0
2.8
2.8
3.1
2.9
3.8
2.8

B. Characteristics of the Environment

% of Investment Financed by Govt.

% of Firms
Receiving Govt.
Financing

Import Penetration
Ratio (%)

Foreign Share of
Establishments (%)

Herfindahl Index

Year

All Plants

Public

Private

Public

Private

Public

Private

Public

Private

Public

Private

1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1993
1995

2.9
3.6
3.0
2.7
3.3
2.0
1.7

31.8
30.3
30.7
27.9
31.6
31.0
22.7

1.4
2.5
1.8
1.7
2.3
1.2
1.2

32.7
28.3
28.4
26.4
26.5
16.5
13.6

1.5
2.9
2.2
2.0
2.3
1.1
1.0

28.1
30.1
15.9
18.7
16.5
15.6
16.2

21.4
20.7
10.9
13.4
12.7
12.5
13.5

3.4
3.9
3.4
3.4
2.3
3.6
2.6

3.3
3.0
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.5
3.2

0.08
0.10
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.11
0.11

0.09
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.10

system and reduced the privileges of state banks. Forty new
domestic banks were established between 1988 and 1990,
and there was a dramatic growth in the Jakarta stock
exchange, thereby providing new sources of investment
financing (see Bresnan, 1993, p. 265). By 1994, the share of
private banks in total outstanding loans exceeded 50%, well
above the 25% share of 10 years earlier (World Bank, 1995).
The Indonesian data set that we use is an annual census of
manufacturing establishments. Data were available for 1975
through 1995, but information on financing sources is only
available beginning in 1981. The number of observations
ranges from 6,258 in 1982 to over 12,904 in 1995. The data
set includes information on output, the number of skilled
and unskilled workers, investment, material inputs, compensation, ownership, location, age, and financing sources.
Pitt and Lee (1981) used this data set for 1972–1975 to
study the impact of foreign ownership on the productivity of
weaving firms. Goeltom (1995) used the 1981–1988 census
data to study the impact of financial liberalization on efficiency in the manufacturing sector. To date no one has used
the Indonesian census to study the effects of ownership and
the environment on productivity growth.
Public ownership is measured by the percentage of equity
owned by the central government or regional governments
(PUB). The soft budget constraint is measured by the
degree of access to government loans, specifically the share
of the plant’s investments that are financed by government
sources (GOVFIN). This variable could include loans from
the government as well as transfers of government funds to
public-sector plants through direct grants or subsidies. Even
if there is a large loan component to the government
investment source, government loans have a large subsidy

component in that many of these loans are never repaid at
all. In addition, as pointed out earlier, the interest-rate
subsidy on government loans ranged from 500 to 800 basis
points during this period. Domestic competition is proxied
by the Herfindahl index (HERF) in the plant’s industry. The
index is defined as the sum of the squared plant-level market
shares for all four-digit sectors and years. FOR is the
foreign share of investment at the plant.
The ideal measure of protection against import competition is data on tariffs and nontariff barriers. Unfortunately,
however, time-series sector-level data on tariffs are not
available for Indonesia before 1989. Consequently, we use
import penetration as an (imperfect) proxy for trade policy.
In order to measure the extent of import competition, data
from the Indonesian census were merged with import and
export data collected by the United Nations. Inasmuch as
the United Nations trade data (as made available to the
World Bank), are available on an ISIC basis, it was possible
to merge the two databases by three-digit ISIC. The United
Nations data included information on both net exports and
imports by ISIC. Import penetration (MPEN) is defined as
imports divided by domestic production plus imports. Domestic production was provided by the United Nations as
well.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics from the Indonesian manufacturing census. A private establishment is
defined as one with 100% private (nongovernment) equity,
while a public establishment, as one with any amount of
central or regional government equity participation. In the
remainder of the paper, however, public ownership is defined as a continuous variable which varies between 0 and
100%. We prefer to remain agnostic on the question of how
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much public ownership is sufficient to change behavior,
leading us to define PUB as continuous in all tables except
table 1. Panel A of table 1 shows that PSEs, which accounted for 13%–18% of total manufacturing output over
1981–1995, are twice as old as private firms, are at least
four times as large, and have a higher ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers. Panel B documents the different environments in which public and private enterprises operate in
Indonesia and the changes in these environments over time.
Between 1981 and 1993 approximately 30% of public
enterprise investment was financed by government sources,
compared to only 1% to 2% for private establishments. Note
that by 1995, the share of public enterprise investment
financed by government sources had fallen to 23%, because
of the rise of alternative sources of financing. In the early
1980s, approximately 30% of public firms received government financing, but by 1995, only 13% were doing so.
Throughout 1981–1995, no more than 3% of private-sector
firms received government financing. There is little difference in the proportion of establishments that are foreignowned or in the Herfindahl index across the two ownership
categories.12
There were significant trade reforms in Indonesia during
the mid-1980s. In 1989, for example, average tariffs in the
manufacturing sector were at 26%, with a minimum tariff
rate of 5% and a maximum tariff rate of almost 60%. By
1995, average tariffs had fallen to 18%, with no changes in
minimum tariffs but with a reduction in the maximum
average tariff across sectors to 35%. These represent significant reductions in protection for manufacturing. At the
same time, however, overall import penetration ratios fell
after 1983. The results suggest that compared to privatesector firms, public-sector firms operate in sectors where the
import penetration ratio is higher. It is certainly possible to
observe both falling tariffs and falling import penetration, as
domestic firms become more internationally competitive
and provide a greater share of domestic demand. Unfortunately, we only have tariff data for 1989–1995 and are thus
unable to use tariffs as our measure of international competition. To assess whether import penetration does provide
information on openness, we ran regressions and calculated
the correlation between import penetration and tariffs for
1989–1995. The correlation coefficient between import penetration and tariffs is 0.50 and is significantly negative at the
1% level—higher tariffs are associated with lower import
penetration in Indonesia. This suggests that for our purposes, import penetration is an adequate measure of international competition, but its usefulness is hidden in the
aggregate trends presented in table 1.
Table 2 provides information, by industrial sector, on the
share of output accounted for by public enterprises and the
percentage of investment financed by government sources
12 However, if we weight the means by output, giving more weight to
larger enterprises, then the means suggest a much stronger presence of
foreign enterprises in the private-sector.

and foreign sources in public and private enterprises. The
degree of private competition facing public enterprises varies significantly across sectors. In some sectors, such as
food products, industrial chemicals, and iron and steel,
public enterprises account for a major share of production.
In many other sectors, such as tobacco, apparel, footwear,
and professional equipment, public enterprises account for a
small share of overall productive activity. Note that, even
within the public-sector, there are variations across industries in the share of investment financed by the government.
For example, in the food products industry, 47% of investment by public enterprises is financed by government
sources, whereas in the industrial chemicals industry, only
22% is. Similarly, we observe variation across industries in
the share of investment financed by foreign owners. For
example, in the nonferrous metals industry 47% of investment by public enterprises is financed by foreign owners; in
the metal products industry, only 20% is. In order to allow
for the possibility that plant-level observations within industry sectors may not be independent, our equations will be
estimated with standard errors clustered by industry sector.
OTHER VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: The dependent variable,
Y, is measured by the real value of annual output.13 Inputs
in the vector Z include the number of skilled production
workers (SKILLED), the number of unskilled workers
(UNSKILLED), the sum of the real value of domestically
produced raw materials, imported raw materials, and energy
used (MATERIALS), and the real value of investment or
capital (CAPITAL). 14 The manufacturing survey requires
respondents to report the current value of their capital stock
at the end of the year, which (coupled with the fact that
inflation in Indonesia during this period was not very high)
permits an accurate measure of capital.
Because public enterprises are less likely to raise funds on
the stock exchange and firms that raise funds on the stock
exchange may be partially disciplined by the information
revealed through share prices, we also add a dummy variable
(STOCK) which equals 1 if the stock exchange is a source of
investment financing for the firm. Laffont and Tirole (1993)
argue that the kinds of problems that arise when there is
separation of ownership and control can be mitigated by stock
market participation. This is because the stock market provides
at least a partial disciplining device to managers through stock
prices. However, limited stock market participation, noisy
prices, and different ownership structures can limit the amount
of information such participation is likely to convey. Inasmuch
13 One shortcoming of the data is that we do not have separate price
deflators for public and private enterprises. Of course, to the extent that
price controls or other regulatory differences are unique to an enterprise
and remain fixed over time, these unobservables are captured by plant
fixed effect.
14 Because the census data only report the value of the capital stock
beginning in 1987, we have chosen to proxy capital stock by investment.
By doing this, we are in effect assuming either zero depreciation or that
the omitted term, lagged capital stock multiplied by the rate of depreciation, does not induce any omitted variable bias.
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SECTOR

Percentage of Investment
Financed by Government
(All Years) (%)

Percentage of Investment
Financed by Foreign Owner
(All Years) (%)

ISIC Code

Percentage of Output
Produced by Each
Sector (%)
(1)

Percentage of Output
Produced by PublicSector Enterprises
(All Years) (%)
(2)

Public Sector
(3)

Private Sector
(4)

Public Sector
(5)

Private Sector
(6)

311
312
313
314
321

Food products
Food products, NEL
Beverages
Tobacco
Textiles

9.8
2.7
0.8
10.9
12.3

23.7
4.6
8.0
0.2
5.7

46.9
22.9
0.0
16.3
23.5

1.7
1.7
0.9
6.6
1.7

1.3
5.5
54.3
37.0
10.5

13.1
20.1
33.0
4.9
16.6

322
323
324
331
332

Apparel
Leather products
Footwear
Wood products
Furniture

1.8
0.3
0.8
11.0
0.4

0.2
1.9
0.6
2.1
1.0

20.6
40.0
18.4
18.4
0.0

2.8
0.6
1.1
1.7
1.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
4.9

2.2
54.8
33.3
6.6
0.0

341
342
351
352
354

Paper products
Printing, publishing
Industrial chemicals
Other chemicals
Petroleum products

2.8
0.9
5.3
5.1
0.0

17.8
7.1
50.5
2.0
—

28.0
33.4
22.1
39.8
—

1.1
1.6
1.8
0.7
—

0.0
17.9
5.6
27.2
—

19.9
2.2
29.5
36.5
20.3

355
356
361
362
363

Rubber products
Plastic products
Pottery and china
Glass products
Cement products

4.8
2.4
0.4
0.5
2.5

7.1
0.1
1.5
11.1
1.4

38.7
3.7
3.8
0.0
19.2

2.2
0.8
1.2
2.0
2.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7

19.7
9.4
15.5
25.8
1.0

364
369
371
372
381

Clay products
Nonmetal products
Iron and steel
Nonferrous metals
Metal products

0.1
0.2
7.6
1.3
4.1

0.01
5.3
62.1
46.1
11.6

7.7
17.8
39.1
21.5
19.4

0.9
1.3
3.7
0.0
1.2

0.0
0.0
13.2
47.6
19.7

0.2
2.1
28.7
13.6
22.3

382
383
384
385
390

Machinery, NEL
Electrical machinery
Transport equipment
Professional equipment
Other industries

1.1
4.0
5.7
0.1
2.9

14.0
10.0
9.4
0.3
0.2

31.2
23.0
37.7
0.0
0.0

0.8
0.7
1.9
1.4
1.3

4.7
27.7
1.8
0.0
0.0

42.4
28.5
22.1
5.6
24.4

as it is very uncommon in Indonesia for firms with publicsector ownership to obtain stock market financing (only 20
observations), we do not include an interaction term between
PUB and STOCK.15 Finally, all regressions include a vector of
industry dummies (IND) and a vector of region dummies (R).
Our final estimating equation is
d ln Yit ⫽ 1 dPUBit ⫺ 2 d共PUBit ⫻ time兲

冘 B d ln Z
M

⫹

m

mit

⫺ ␥1 dGOVFINit

m⫽1

⫺ ␥ 2 dHERF jt ⫹ ␥ 3 dMPEN jt ⫹ ␥ 4 dFOR it t

(5)

⫹ ␥ 5 dSTOCK it ⫺ ␦ 8 d共PUB ⫻ GOVFIN兲 it
⫺ ␦ 10 d共PUB ⫻ HERF兲 it ⫹ ␦ 11 d共PUB ⫻ MPEN兲 it
⫹ ␦ 12 d共PUB ⫻ FOR兲 it ⫹ d t ⫹ R ⫹ IND ⫹ e i .
15 This contrasts with the situation in India, where partially privatized
firms do trade on the stock exchange (Gupta, 2003). In addition, although
stock market participation may be endogenous, the lack of good instruments prevents us from addressing this issue. STOCK is included primarily as an additional control and is not the focus of this paper.

Equation (5) eliminates any unobserved differences
between public and private enterprises (e.g., different
prices, hidden subsidies, a different product mix, or a
different regulatory environment) that are fixed over
time. Prior research on estimating production functions
has argued that there is a simultaneity bias between
productivity and input choices (Olley and Pakes, 1996),
leading to biased coefficients on the inputs. A number of
approaches have been suggested to address this problem,
including the two-step method proposed by Olley and
Pakes, the generalized method of moments (GMM), and
instrumental variable (IV) techniques. However, previous
work by Harrison (1994) as well as new research by Van
Biesenbroeck (2003) has shown that the actual productivity estimates derived using these alternative methods
are not significantly different from those derived using
OLS. The Olley-Pakes approach would require us to
eliminate observations with zero investment, and the
other approaches would require estimating a value-added
production function which ignores how productive material inputs are utilized by the firm. Therefore, in our
analysis, we rely on Van Biesenbroeck’s conclusion and
treat input choices as exogenous.
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IV.

Results

A. Empirical Estimates of the Effects of Public Ownership and
the Environment—First-Difference Fixed-Effects Results

Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (5).
Columns (1) and (2) do not include any controls for the
environment. Column (3) includes the direct effects of the
environment, and column (4) includes the interaction effects
between ownership and environment. The results show that
PUB by itself is not significant but three out of four
interactions between PUB and the environment are significant. Specifically, we find that PUB ⫻ GOVFIN is negative and significant, and PUB ⫻ MPEN and PUB ⫻ FOR
are positive and significant. In other words, there may be an
agency problem associated with public-sector ownership,
but it only appears when firms are given access to government financing or protected from import competition or
foreign ownership. The kind of agency problem modeled by
Ehrlich et al. (1994) does not appear to matter in Indonesia:
public ownership by itself has no independent, negative
effect on either productivity levels or productivity growth.
But ownership does matter. The coefficients in column (4)
imply that a full privatization would be accompanied by an
increase in total factor productivity growth of 1.6 percentage points.16
As an alternative to privatization, this increase in productivity could be achieved by manipulating the enterprise’s
environment. In particular, if state financing of new investment by public enterprises falls from 100% to 70%, or
import penetration rises by 3 percentage points, or foreign
ownership in the enterprises increases by three-quarters of a
percentage point, these changes will each produce the same
gain in productivity as a full privatization. These latter
changes are likely to be much less painful politically and
represent much more incremental changes than a shift in
majority ownership from public to private ownership. Reducing the role of state banks to two-thirds of their previous
loan levels was not difficult, nor is it difficult to increase
foreign ownership by less than 1 percentage point. For
example, the number of foreign firms in the manufacturing
sector in Indonesia increased from almost 3% of all firms in
1991 to over 6% in 1999. Similarly, import penetration in
most developing countries has increased significantly more
than 3 percentage points during the last decade.
The results in table 3 provide support for the argument
that a major source of public-sector inefficiency is the
environment (as measured by the soft budget constraint,
import protection, and protection from foreign ownership)
in which these firms operate.17 The environment matters
because only PSEs which receive soft loans or are shielded
16 This number is based on the coefficients reported in column (4) of
table 3 and assume that T ⫽ 1989, GOVFIN ⫽ 1, MPEN ⫽ 0.165,
FOR ⫽ 0.023, and HERF ⫽ 0.07. The assumed values for MPEN,
FOR, and HERF are taken from table 1 for public firms in 1989.
17 The equations in table 3 were also estimated without the PUB ⫻ T
interaction term, and the results were virtually unchanged.

TABLE 3.—EFFECT

OF

OWNERSHIP AND THE ENVIRONMENT
1982–1995 FIRST DIFFERENCES

ON

(1)

(2)

PUB ⫻ T

.002
(0.04)
—

GOVFIN

—

0.60
(0.99)
⫺.007
(⫺1.03)
—

HERF

—

—

MPEN ⫺1

—

—

FOR

—

—

STOCK

—

—

PUB ⫻ GOVFIN

—

—

PUB ⫻ HERF

—

—

—

PUB ⫻ MPEN

—

—

—

PUB ⫻ FOR

—

—

—

.068
(11.73)
.191
(14.61)
.624
(31.42)
.003
(4.05)
.65
30,707

.068
(11.75)
.191
(14.51)
.624
(31.43)
.003
(4.31)
.65
30,707

.080
(10.66)
.173
(13.78)
.612
(30.12)
.003
(3.08)
.62
19,085

PUB

SKILLED
UNSKILLED
MATERIALS
CAPITAL
R2
No. of observations

(3)
.796
(1.11)
⫺.009
(⫺1.15)
⫺.014
(⫺0.79)
.057
(0.89)
.051
(0.84)
.001
(1.12)
.027
(1.25)
—

PRODUCTIVITY:
(4)
.289
(0.43)
⫺.004
(⫺0.52)
.020
(0.87)
.057
(0.87)
.008
(0.12)
.001
(1.04)
.028
(1.31)
⫺.069
(⫺2.08)
.042
(0.22)
.543
(2.78)
.020
(1.97)
.079
(10.66)
.173
(13.87)
.611
(30.06)
.003
(3.07)
.62
19,085

Dependent variable: log change in real output. t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedesticity and clustering. All specifications include year, ISIC, and region dummies. The
change in the capital stock is proxied by investment for first-differences specification.

from import competition or foreign ownership perform
worse than private enterprises. Ownership matters in that,
given the same amount of competition, public-sector firms
are less productive than their private-sector counterparts.
B. Endogeneity of Ownership and Government Financing

It could be argued that our findings that public ownership
and government financing reduce efficiency may reflect
reverse causality, that is, that more efficient public-sector
firms are selected for privatization and that government
financing is essentially a bailout given to failing enterprises.18 We consider whether this argument is correct by
using three approaches, which are described below. First,
we compared the performance of firms prior to receiving
government financing or prior to privatization with that of
other firms. Second, we introduced instruments for our
GOVFIN variable. Third, we used placebo leads for the
PUB and GOVFIN variables. All three approaches suggest
that endogeneity is not a problem.
18 It is less likely that the other measures of the environment, import
penetration and foreign ownership, are endogenous; for they are likely to
vary primarily across industrial sectors, rather than across ownership.
Hence our analysis of the endogeneity of the environment focuses only on
government financing.

DISENTANGLING THE SOURCES OF PUBLIC-SECTOR INEFFICIENCY

Comparing Pre- and Postprivatization Performance:
We examine the performance before and after privatization of
privatized firms compared to firms with no change in ownership, and the performance before and after receipt of government financing for public-sector firms that received the financing compared to public-sector firms that did not.19 The results
are shown in table 4, where selection for government financing
is examined in panel A and selection into privatization is
examined in panel B. Panel A shows that in the two years prior
to receipt of government financing, those public-sector firms
that receive the financing are not performing either better or
worse than other public-sector firms, where performance is
measured either as total factor productivity growth, the log of
sales per employee, the change in the log of sales per employee, cost per unit, or the change in cost per unit. Panel B
shows that public-sector firms that are subsequently privatized
perform no better or worse, as measured by total factor productivity growth, the change in the log of sales per employee,
or the change in cost per unit, than firms with no change in
ownership. Like Ehrlich et al. (1994), we find that privatized
firms have higher levels of productivity as measured by the log
of sales per employee or cost per unit. However, their growth
rates are not significantly different from those of plants with no
change in ownership.
The results in table 4 suggest that selection is not the
cause of the findings in table 3 that both ownership and
environment are responsible for the observed inferior performance of publicly owned manufacturing enterprises in
Indonesia. There is no evidence that poor performers were
subsequently bailed out with government financing. Nor is
there any evidence that privatizing firms were selected on
the basis of unusually good or bad previous performance,
which could lead to under- or overestimating the gains from
privatization.
Instrumental Variable Estimates: We also reestimated
the productivity equations using an IV approach. Our focus
is on the endogeneity of GOVFIN; we assume that changes
in ownership are exogenously determined, for several reasons. First, public ownership of enterprises was determined
decades earlier, as the government sought to take over the
ownership of enterprises that were in foreign hands. Because the privatization of manufacturing enterprises is part
of a widespread economy-wide mandate to deregulate the
Indonesian economy, and occurred in all sectors, it is reasonable to accept that ownership is exogenously determined. In addition, the results in table 4 indicate no systematic bias in the pattern of privatization. Instruments for
GOVFIN and GOVFIN ⫻ PUB are: the second lag of
GOVFIN, the lag of SKILLED, (the lag of PUB) ⫻
GOVFIN, (the lag of SKILLED) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the
19 In their analysis of the Fortune 500 companies, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) found that privatization is associated with improved profitability, but the improvement largely occurs during the 3 years just before
privatization, that is, governments efficiently restructure some firms before selling them.
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TABLE 4.—RELATIVE PERFORMANCE BEFORE AND AFTER RECEIPT
GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND PRIVATIZATION

OF

2 Years Prior 1 Year Prior 1 Year After
A. Government Financing*
TFP growth
log(sales/employee)
Change in log(sales/employee)
Cost per unit
Change in cost per unit

⫺.079
(1.2)
⫺.008
(0.5)
⫺.008
(0.9)
⫺.008
(0.2)
.028
(0.9)

⫺.031
(0.7)
⫺.002
(0.2)
.002
(0.4)
⫺.020
(0.9)
.023
(1.1)

.052
(1.6)
.002
(0.2)
.001
(0.2)
⫺.023
(1.1)
.000
(0.0)

.028
(0.8)
.070
(6.6)
.011
(1.8)
⫺.087
(5.0)
⫺.014
(0.8)

⫺.024
(0.6)
.045
(3.5)
⫺.003
(0.4)
⫺.086
(4.1)
⫺.010
(0.5)

B. Privatization†
TFP growth
log(sales/employee)
Change in log(sales/employee)
Cost per unit
Change in cost per unit

.018
(0.5)
.087
(6.9)
.002
(0.2)
⫺.101
(4.8)
.004
(0.2)

Notes: t-value for test of differences in means in . Values indicate differences between plants and
control group. For all values other than TFP growth, values are normalized by sector means. Therefore
a value of 0.014 for log(sales/employee) indicates that firms receiving loans had higher sales per
employee (relative to sector mean) by 1.4%. Cost per unit is the ratio of cost of sales to sales.
*Control group is public-sector enterprises without government support.
†Control group is plants with no change in ownership.

lag of UNSKILLED) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the lag of
MATERIALS) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the lag of CAPITAL) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the second lag of CAPITAL) ⫻
(the lag of PUB), the lag of PUB, the lag of GIFT, and the
lag of FOR. The results are shown in column (1) of table 5.
Allowing for endogeneity of GOVFIN does not change our
earlier conclusion that PSEs in Indonesia perform more
poorly if they receive government financing and/or protection from foreign ownership.20
Adding Placebo Leads: Our third approach to dealing
with potential endogeneity of GOVFIN and PUB is to add
the leads of GOVFIN, PUB and their interaction to the
regressions in order to determine if the relationships between ownership, government financing, and productivity
that we observed in table 3 existed before the changes took
place. The results are shown in column (2) of table 5. We
find that none of the leads are significant and our original
finding regarding the negative and significant coefficient on
the interaction between PUB and GOVFIN still holds.
We conclude from the results shown in tables 4 and 5 that
endogeneity is not influencing our results. As an additional test,
we also examined the results on the determinants of GOVFIN
using a broad spectrum of variables—essentially expanding
the instrument list and examining the results from the first stage
20 The interaction term between public ownership and import penetration
is no longer significant. Our chi-square tests suggest that our instruments
are valid. For the chi-square test, a value less than 16.9 indicates that we
cannot reject the validity of the instruments at the 95% confidence level.
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TABLE 5.—EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP AND THE ENVIRONMENT ON PRODUCTIVITY:
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES AND “PLACEBO LEADS” ESTIMATES, 1982–1995
Instrumental
Variables
(1)
⫺.532
(⫺0.53)
.006
(0.55)
.033
(0.53)
⫺.217
(⫺1.84)
—

PUB
PUB ⫻ T
GOVFIN
PUB ⫻ GOVFIN
PUB(LEAD)
PUB ⫻ T(LEAD)

—

GOVFIN(LEAD)

—

PUB ⫻ GOVFIN(LEAD)

—
⫺.069
(⫺0.99)
.022
(0.25)
.001
(1.37)
.041
(1.67)
.328
(1.82)
.535
(1.54)
.022
(1.94)
.079
(7.67)
.185
(11.77)
.573
(24.03)
.005
(4.19)

HERF
MPEN ⫺1
FOR
STOCK
PUB ⫻ HERF t⫺1
PUB ⫻ MPEN
PUB ⫻ FOR
SKILLED
UNSKILLED
MATERIALS
CAPITAL
R2
No. of observations
Chi-square for over identification test

.57
10,008
6.0

With Placebo Leads
for PUB and
GOVFIN
(2)
.149
(0.16)
⫺.002
(⫺0.22)
.039
(1.80)
⫺.089
(⫺2.51)
.131
(0.18)
⫺.003
(⫺0.36)
⫺.033
(⫺0.76)
.031
(0.55)
⫺.112
(⫺1.71)
⫺.039
(⫺0.62)
.001
(1.68)
.032
(1.23)
.304
(1.35)
.677
(3.30)
.006
(1.06)
.085
(9.48)
.187
(12.88)
.595
(27.17)
.002
(2.36)
.61
13,243

Notes: Dependent variable: log change in real output. t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedesticity and clustering. All specifications include year, ISIC, and region dummies.
The instruments for GOVFIN and GOVFIN ⫻ PUB in column (1) are: the lag of SKILLED, (the lag
of PUB) ⫻ GOVFIN, (the lag of SKILLED) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the lag of first-differences
UNSKILLED) ⫻ (the lag of PUB) (the lag of MATERIALS) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the lag of
CAPITAL) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), (the second lag of CAPITAL) ⫻ (the lag of PUB), the second lag of
GOVFIN, the lag of PUB, the lag of GIFT, and the lag of FOR. For the chi-square test, a value of less
than 16.9 indicates that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments at the 95% confidence level.

of the IV estimation. The results (available on request from the
authors) suggest no statistically significant relationship between firm profits and the availability of government financing.
What we do find, however, is that firms most likely to receive
government financing are small, fast-growing firms in less
concentrated sectors. These results seem to suggest that the
more successful firms received government financing, refuting
the possibility of bailouts.
V.

Extensions

In this section, we describe a number of extensions to the
basic empirical model, which are presented in table 6. In

particular, we expand the model to create a more general
framework which allows for variable markups and factor
shares across ownership categories and different enterprises,
as described in the Appendix. The general conclusion from
these extensions is that our basic results in table 3 are robust
to alternative specifications.
A. Nonlinear Effects of Ownership

We considered the possibility that the coefficients on the
interaction terms between PUB and the various measures of
the environment are capturing a nonlinear quadratic effect
of ownership. This would be the case if GOVFIN, MPEN,
HERF, or FOR were highly collinear with PUB and were
simply acting as a proxy for the nonlinear effect of public
ownership when it is interacted with the environment. We
tested for this by adding the square of PUB to the regressions. The results, shown in column (1) of table 6, indicate
that our original findings remain unchanged; the interaction
terms PUB ⫻ GOVFIN, PUB ⫻ MPEN, and PUB ⫻
FOR remain significant.
B. Alternative Definition of Government Financing

Because government financing is defined as the ratio of
public loans to total investment, a firm with a high degree of
government subsidies might not appear to be heavily subsidized if investment is also high. Consequently, we redefined government financing as the real value of government
financing, instead of normalizing by investment. The results, shown in column (2) of table 6, indicate that PUB ⫻
GOVFIN is still negative and significant.
C. Lagged Effect of Ownership Changes

It is possible that changes in ownership do not have an
immediate impact on performance, but only affect performance with a lag. Consequently, we redefined PUB and
PUB ⫻ T as the lags of those variables. This allows the
independent effect of ownership to operate more slowly.
The results, shown in column (3) of table 6, indicate that our
original results on the effects of ownership, soft loans, and
import penetration are unchanged, although the interaction
term between PUB and FOR is no longer significant.
D. Estimating TFPG in Two Steps

Many researchers who investigate the determinants of
productivity growth prefer to follow a two-step approach,
where they first estimate TFPG and then in a second step
regress TFPG on its determinants. This approach is particularly useful if there is multicollinearity between the inputs
and the policy variables, creating a challenge to researchers
who seek to establish a more precise relationship between
policies and performance. We used this two-step approach
for estimating TFPG by first estimating an economy-wide
production function and then calculating TFPG as the re-
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TABLE 6.—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
(1)
Adds
PUBSQ
PUB

(2)
Real Value
of
GOVFIN

(3)
Lagged
PUB

(4)
TFP Estimated
in Two Steps

(5)
Two-Step TFP with
Sector-Specific
Production Functions

(6)
Markups Vary by
Ownership and
GOVFIN

0.363
(0.54)
⫺0.003
(⫺0.47)
⫺0.117
(⫺0.50)
0.020
(0.86)
0.057
(0.87)
0.008
(0.12)
0.001
(1.04)
0.028
(1.31)
⫺0.068
(⫺2.07)
0.044
(0.23)
0.543
(2.77)
0.19
(1.86)
—

0.289
(0.43)
⫺0.004
(⫺0.52)
—

0.258
(0.40)
⫺0.004
(⫺0.56)
—

0.125
(0.20)
⫺0.001
(⫺0.17)
—

0.096
(0.15)
⫺0.001
(⫺0.12)
—

0.032
(0.05)
⫺0.001
(⫺0.07)
—

0.003
(1.84)
0.058
(0.89)
0.008
(0.13)
0.001
(1.03)
0.027
(1.28)
⫺0.005
(⫺2.41)
0.040
(0.21)
0.543
(2.79)
0.020
(1.98)
—

0.037
(1.24)
⫺0.047
(⫺0.72)
⫺0.023
(⫺0.38)
0.0003
(0.93)
0.030
(1.45)
⫺0.083
(⫺2.06)
0.181
(0.95)
0.472
(3.04)
0.004
(0.85)
—

0.015
(0.88)
0.077
(1.02)
0.061
(1.01)
0.0003
(0.68)
0.026
(1.21)
⫺0.059
(⫺2.42)
0.193
(0.69)
0.478
(2.56)
0.023
(2.61)
—

0.016
(0.96)
0.078
(1.00)
0.057
(0.93)
0.0003
(0.71)
0.028
(1.32)
⫺0.059
(⫺2.30)
0.197
(0.73)
0.483
(2.61)
0.023
(2.71)
—

GOVFIN ⫻ dX

—

—

—

—

—

0.054
(0.74)
0.078
(1.01)
0.058
(0.94)
0.0003
(0.74)
0.027
(1.25)
⫺0.051
(⫺2.18)
0.212
(0.78)
0.482
(2.63)
0.023
(2.59)
⫺0.132
(⫺1.91)
0.023
(0.62)

M
dX ⫽ ¥ m⫽1
B mijt d ln Z mij

—

—

—

—

—

.62
19,085

.62
19,085

.60
15,948

.02
19,085

.03
19,085

PUB ⫻ T
PUBSQ
GOVFIN
HERF
MPEN ⫺1
FOR
STOCK
PUB ⫻ GOVFIN
PUB ⫻ HERF
PUB ⫻ MPEN
PUB ⫻ FOR
PUB ⫻ dX

R2
N

1.152
(67.8)
.67
19,085

Notes: Dependent variable: log change in real output, 1982–1995. All regressions include SKILLED, UNSKILLED, MATERIALS, CAPITAL, year, ISIC, and region dummies. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and clustering. See Appendix for a discussion of dX. The coefficient on dX can be interpreted as the degree of departure from perfect competition, the so-called markup.

sidual by subtracting coefficient-weighted changes in inputs
from output growth. We then regressed TFPG on all variables except the inputs. The results, shown in column (4) of
table 6, leave our main conclusions unchanged.
E. Two-Step TFPG Estimates by Sector

To the extent that factor shares or markups vary across
sectors, the framework presented in equations (1)–(4) would
justify presenting separate estimates by sector. We therefore
modified the two-step approach described above by estimating
sector-specific production functions in the first stage, allowing
the coefficients on the inputs to vary for each three-digit
manufacturing sector. The results of the second stage, in which
TFPG is calculated as the residual, are shown in column (5) of
table 6. Again, our main conclusions are unchanged; the main
effect of PUB is insignificant, and the interaction terms between PUB and GOVFIN, MPEN, and FOR are significant.
F. Allowing Factor Price, Factor Shares, and Markups to
Vary Across Ownership and Government Financing
Categories

The most general framework for production function estimation, presented in the Appendix, allows factor shares to vary

across establishments and markups to vary across both ownership categories and government financing categories. If PSEs
or enterprises that receive government financing face different
factor prices from private enterprises or enterprises without
government financing, then their factor shares will not be
equal. Different types of ownership or financing sources could
also lead to different factor intensities, which would again
imply that factor shares should vary across establishments. In
addition, coefficients on inputs could also vary due to imperfect competition, as the model presented in the Appendix
makes very clear. To allow for these possibilities, we estimated
equation (A-6) in the Appendix, which allows us to calculate
establishment-specific factor shares from the data and also
takes into account the possibility of imperfect competition. In
addition, we allowed the degree of imperfect competition to
vary across public and private enterprises and also as a function
of government financing.
The results, shown in column (6) of table 6, indicate that the
coefficients on the inputs dX are systematically lower for PSEs,
suggesting lower markups. Across all enterprises, the coefficient on factor-share weighted inputs dX is equal to 1.152,
indicating on average excess profits of 15%. PSEs, however,
have essentially zero excess profits, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient ⫺0.132 on the

146

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

interaction between PUB and the inputs. This suggests that
moving from public to private ownership is likely to increase
prices or markups, as many critics of privatization have
claimed.
There is no systematic relationship between markups and
government financing, as indicated by the small and statistically insignificant coefficient on GOVFIN ⫻ dX. Adding
all these interaction terms and allowing for this more general specification does not affect the magnitude or the
significance of the coefficients on PUB, PUB ⫻ GOVFIN,
PUB ⫻ MPEN, and PUB ⫻ FOR.
VI.

Conclusions

An unanswered question in the debate on public-sector
inefficiency is whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively substitute for privatization. In this paper
we tackle this question using a 1981–1995 panel data set of all
public and private manufacturing establishments in Indonesia.
We consider two leading hypotheses: (1) the ownership hypothesis, which postulates that PSEs are inefficient because of
monitoring problems, and (2) the environment hypothesis,
which postulates that PSEs are inefficient because of the
environment in which they operate, as measured by the soft
budget constraint or barriers to competition. Indonesia is an
ideal setting to test these two hypotheses because of the large
exogenous changes in ownership and the environment that
took place during 1981–1995.
The empirical results, which are obtained from fixed-effects
specifications, provide support for both hypotheses. We find
that public ownership by itself has no independent negative
effect on either the level of productivity or on productivity
growth, but ownership itself does matter in Indonesia, because,
for a given level of government financing and competition,
PSEs perform worse than their private-sector counterparts. The
environment matters because only those PSEs which received
government financing or those shielded from import competition or foreign ownership performed worse than private enterprises. We calculate that if a public firm is fully privatized, its
productivity will rise by 1.6 percentage points. The same result
could be achieved by manipulating the environment. In particular, if state financing of new investment by the public enterprise falls from 100% to 70%, or import penetration rises by 3
percentage points, or foreign ownership in the enterprise increases by three-quarters of a percentage point, these changes
will each produce the same gain in productivity as a full
privatization. We considered the possibility that our results
could be plagued by endogeneity bias and used a number of
techniques to control for this possibility, all of which led to the
conclusion that endogeneity is not a problem in our data.
One question which immediately arises is how significant
these gains in productivity are, and how easy it is to reform the
environment, in contrast to a full or partial privatization.
Between 1989 and 1995, when most of the privatizations,
reductions in government financing and increases in foreign
investment occurred, TFP growth for PSEs in manufacturing

was slightly higher than 1 percentage point per year. This
translates to cumulative productivity growth of 7.4 percentage
points from 1989 to 1995. During this period, the typical partial
privatization led to an increase in private ownership of 20
percentage points (i.e., a reduction of public ownership from
60% to 40%), which would contribute—according to our
results—to an increase in productivity of 0.3%. This suggests
that partial privatizations alone during this period made a very
small contribution to overall productivity growth for PSEs. By
contrast, reforms in the environment provided a more significant contribution. The reduction in government financing of
investment by PSEs of 9 percentage points between 1989 and
1995 implies an increase in productivity of 0.5%, whereas the
0.6 percentage point increase in foreign ownership of remaining PSEs translated into total factor productivity growth of
more than 1%. Together, these two changes account for almost
two percentage points, that is, almost 30%, of the observed 7
percentage point increase in total factor productivity for remaining PSEs.
These results suggest that two different types of policies
could be used to increase the efficiency of PSEs in Indonesia or
in other countries which have recently embarked on privatization programs. Because private firms in Indonesia outperform
public-sector firms for a given degree of competition, simply
privatizing the firms should lead to gains in efficiency. But the
results also demonstrate that an alternative way to achieve
efficiency gains is to manipulate the environment, specifically
to reduce or eliminate government financing for public enterprises or to increase import competition or foreign ownership
for these firms. Because many privatizations are partial and the
government typically retains some ownership, a third policy
option that combines privatization and environmental reform
also exists. Our results indicate that environmental reforms
combined with privatization will yield the biggest improvements in efficiency.
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APPENDIX
A general production function for plant i in sector j at time t is given
by,
Y ijt ⫽ A ijt F共Z ijt 兲.

(A-1)

The output Y ijt is a real measure of plant-level output, and Z is a vector of
M inputs. In our estimation, we will include as inputs both skilled and
unskilled labor, capital inputs, and materials. A ijt is a plant-specific index
of Hicks-neutral technical progress, which will depend on a number of
factors, including ownership. Totally differentiating equation (A-1) and
dividing through by Y, we have
dY
⫽
Y ijt

冘 冉 冊
m

Y
Z m

dZ m
Y

dA
.
A ijt

⫹
ijt

(A-2)

In this framework, imperfect competition enters equation (A-2) because
plants with market power do not set the value marginal product P(Y/Z)
equal to the factor price. If we assume Cournot behavior by imperfectly
competitive plants, then we can derive the first-order conditions from each
plant’s profit maximization and write each of the partial derivatives Y/Z

冉 冊 冉 冊
Y
Z m

⫽

ijt

wm
p

jt

冉 冊

1
wm
⫽
1 ⫹ S ij /e j
p

 ij .

(A-3)

jt

Here S is the i th plant’s share in the j th industry, and e is the elasticity of
demand. Factor prices for input m are given by w m . If plant i is not
perfectly competitive, then the value of the marginal product exceeds the
factor cost by some markup . For simplicity, we will assume that the
markup parameter does not vary across plants or over time.
Substituting equation (A-3) into (A-2) and rearranging terms, we have
dY
⫽ j
Y ijt

冘
m

冉 冊

w m Z m dZ m
dA
⫹
PY Z m
A

.

(A-4)

ijt

The value of w m Z m /PY is the share of the m th factor in total output. We
shall denote this share as B m . Rewriting equation (A-4), we have

冘
M

d ln Yijt ⫽ d ln Aijt ⫹ 

Bm d ln Zmijt .

(A-5)

m⫽1

All variables have been rewritten in log form. Output growth can be
decomposed into two sources: growth in productivity, and growth in input
use. In a regression framework, the coefficients on the M inputs include two
components: the markup parameter , and the factor share. By not constraining the coefficients, we allow both factor shares and markups to vary.
Furthermore, it is possible to estimate the markup parameter by replacing the
coefficient B with the plant-specific factor shares based on expenditures on
different inputs, which are reported by the establishments each year. This
allows factor shares to vary both across time and across establishments.
Furthermore, it is also possible to allow markups to vary across ownership
categories, leading to the following general specification:

冘
M

d ln Yijt ⫽ d ln Aijt ⫹ PRIV v

冉

Bmijt d ln Zmijt

m⫽1

⫹ PUB PUB ⫻

冘
M

m⫽1

冊

(A-6)

Bmijt d ln Zmijt .

In equation (A-6), B is not estimated but calculated from the establishment level data, while the markup is estimated. A version of equation
(A-6) which also allows markups to vary as a function of government
loans is presented in column (6) in table 6.

